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NOTES
THE LEGAL STATUS OF FROZEN EMBRYOS:
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR A
UNIFORM LAW*
INTRODUCTION
The twentieth century has seen some of history's most important and life-
impacting advancements in medical science. One area of medicine that has
advanced rapidly over the past thirty years concerns new reproductive technologies
which help infertile couples have babies. In fact, the "infertility business" has
grown into a two billion dollar a year industry.'
Two major components of this industry are in vitro fertilization-the uniting
of an egg and sperm in a laboratory dish-and the process of freezing human
embryos. As of 1987, there were approximately 4,000 frozen human embryos in
existence as compared to only 300 in 1985.2 These dynamic medical advancements
have challenged the legal community to keep reins on practices affecting embryos.
It appears that state and federal legislatures, however, have failed to enact
effective laws to provide the judicial system with guidelines on how to decide
issues connected with these new reproductive technologies.
Justice Michael Kirby3 has recognized the dangers of the law failing to keep
up with science. "It is for our society to decide whether there is an alternative
or whether the dilemmas posed by modern science and technology, particularly
in the field of bioethics, are just too painful, technical, complicated, sensitive
and controversial for our institutions of govertlment.
'" 4
Part I of this note examines in vitro fertilization and the process of freezing
human embryos, including a description of the various factual contexts which
raise important moral and legal issues surrounding these new reproductive tech-
niques. Part II reviews case and statutory law that has either directly or indirectly
dealt with some of these issues. Part III analyzes various factual scenarios and
answers some of the legal questions, in accordance with the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.5 Finally, part IV
* The authors wish to thank Charles Rice, Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School, for
his review and thoughtful suggestions regarding this note.
1. Bonnicksen, Whose Frozen Embryos?, New York Newsday, Oct. 1, 1989 at 4.
2. Id.
3. The Hon. Justice Michael Kirby has been a Judge of the Supreme Court of New South
Wales, Australia since 1984.
4. Keenan, Science and the Law - Lessons from the Experience of Legislating for the New
Reproductive Technology, 59 AusTRAuAN L.J. 488, 489 (Aug. 1985) (citing M. KIBY, REFORM THE
LAW 238-239 (1983)).
5. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). For a more detailed discussion of the case, see infra notes 111-118
and accompanying text.
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proposes a framework that should be followed by drafters of state laws or a
uniform law to regulate the creation and freezing of human embryos.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Explanation of Artificial Conception
1. Fertilization and Cryopreservation of Embryos
Many couples and individuals who long to have children and suffer from
infertility have, until recently, relied on adoption as the only way to raise a child.
In response to this dilemma, medical researchers developed new ways to assist
such people. One procedure used today is artificial insemination ("Al") of a
woman with sperm from either her husband or a donor.
Another method is in vitro fertilization ("IVF"). Infertile couples typically
use this method to overcome the man's low sperm count or to bypass the
woman's blocked or damaged fallopian tubes. 6 IVF (also known as the "test-
tube baby" technique) is accomplished by retrieving an egg from the woman and
sperm from the man, and uniting them in a laboratory dish. 7 The resulting
embryo is then implanted in the woman's uterus. If this implantation is successful,
the woman will bear a child just as if that child had been conceived naturally.
Unfortunately, this procedure is not as free of complications as the parents
hope. Ova are retrieved from a woman's ovaries in a delicate surgical procedure
called a laparoscopy, performed under general anesthesia. 9 The process involves
the normal risks and pain associated with surgery so it is done as few times as
possible.' 0 Practitioners of IVF generally administer hormones to the woman
before the surgery to induce the release of more than the usual single egg during
ovulation." Therefore, more than one egg can be retrieved during a particular
laparoscopy and subsequently fertilized in the laboratory, preventing the need
for another laparoscopy. To increase the possibility of pregnancy, some clinics
implant more than one fertilized egg at a time; however, this also increases the
chances of a multiple pregnancy. 2 In many IVF cases a mother will give birth
to two babies in one pregnancy, but less than one percent will have more than
two.' 3
Some IVF clinics ask their patients if they desire to have any non-implanted
embryos frozen for use at a future date. Other clinics avoid this sensitive issue
altogether by either removing only those eggs which they expect to fertilize,
implanting all of the fertilized eggs which they deem healthy, or both.
14
6. Wurmbrand, Frozen Embryos: Moral, Social, and Legal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REv.
1079, 1082 (1986).
7. Id.
8. Schwartz, Frozen Embryos: The Constitution on Ice, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 267, 268 (Nov.
1985).
9. L. A4DRaEws, NEw CONCEPTIONS 127 (1984).
10. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 268, 269.
11. Wurmbrand, supra note 6, at 1083.
12. L. ANoREws, supra note 9, at 256.
13. Rudd, Quadruplets Making Thanksgiving Special, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 22, 1990, § 2 at
18.
14. Wurmbrand, supra note 6, at 1083 (citing Grobstein, The Moral Uses of "Spare" Embryos,
12 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5 (June 1982)).
[Vol. 17:97
The Legal Status of Frozen Embryos
Cryopreservation is a process in which embryos are preserved by freezing
them in liquid nitrogen." Embryos are usually frozen at the two-, four-, or eight-
cell stage of development since earlier stage embryos are more difficult to freeze
and later stage embryos are too advanced to develop normally after thawing.
6
These frozen embryos are then stored until the egg-donor or another woman is
ready for implantation.
Those IVF practitioners who fertilize more eggs than are immediately im-
planted in the woman, freezing the remainders for later use, do so for two
primary reasons. First, the woman may not be able to produce a healthy egg in
the future. If the woman anticipates radiation or other therapy which may
damage her ovaries or cause defects in the eggs that she produces, the freezing
process gives her the opportunity to take advantage of these healthy fertilized
eggs for a subsequent pregnancy.17 If the woman is medically unable to go
through another laparoscopy, the eggs harvested from the first surgery can be
used for future implantation." If the woman's ovaries cannot be accessed because
of adhesions or other damage, a subsequent laparoscopy is difficult or impossi-
ble. ' 9
Second, cryopreservation of human embryos may lessen the costs and reduce
the amount of risk and strain that the woman goes through prior to and during
the laparoscopy. 2° In fact, implantation with thawed embryos may increase the
likelihood of a successful pregnancy because they can be implanted during a
nonstimulated cycle. 2' Some IVF clinics also use the cryopreservation process to
avoid the moral issues created by destroying excess embryos. By freezing the
fertilized eggs indefinitely, they hope to avoid being accused of murder or
abortion.?
Cryopreservation is also a helpful technique in other artificial conception
procedures such as embryo transfer for surrogate motherhood.23 Embryo transfer
is the introduction of an embryo into a woman's uterus after in vitro or in vivo
fertilization. 2' This process allows women who are unable to ovulate or who
15. Other uses of cryopreservation include: freezing human sperm (L. ANDREws, supra note 9,
at 176); freezing human ova (Human-egg Banks: Frozen to Life, ECONOMIST, May 14, 1988, at 88)
[hereinafter Frozen to Life]; and freezing animal embryos (Seidel, Superovulation and Embryo
Transfer in Cattle, 211 SCIENCE 351 (1981)).
16. Wurmbrand, supra note 6, at 1083.
17. L. ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 256-257.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Robertson, Embryos, Families and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New
Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. Rav. 939, 949 (1986). In 1983, the average cost of an initial treatment
(screening, laparoscopy, and embryo transfer) was about $7500, with each subsequent attempt (without
screening) costing about $5000. Id. at 943 n.6 (citing Grobstein, Flower & Mendelhoff, External
Human Fertilization: An Evaluation of Policy, 222 SCIENCE 127, 130 (1983)).
21. Robertson, supra note 20, at 949. Not administering hormones prior to and anesthesia during
laparoscopy can make it more likely that the implantation will be successful since these drugs may
render the uterus less likely to accept a transferred embryo. Id.
22. Hundley, Legal Status of Embryos Faces Another Day in Court, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 28,
1989, § IA, at 25, col. 3.
23. L. ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 257. A surrogate mother or carrier is a woman who contracts
and usually receives compensation for becoming pregnant through insemination with the sperm of
the husband of an infertile woman. This surrogate mother then relinquishes any rights to the child
after it is born in favor of the other woman. Id. at 291.
24. Id. at 287. In vitro fertilization involves the uniting of egg and sperm outside of the woman's
body, whereas in vivo fertilization takes place within the woman's body. Id. at 288.
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produce defective eggs to bear a nonbiologically related child. 2s Usually, because
the implantation is made immediately after in vitro or in vivo fertilization, the
embryo transfer process requires the donor's and recipient's menstrual cycles to
be perfectly synchronized. 26 Thus, an elaborate matching system must be used to
find the right donor-recipient combination. 27 If frozen, however, the embryo can
be stored until the recipient is biologically ready for implantation.8 Similarly, a
surrogate mother arrangement can be facilitated much more easily by storing the
frozen embryo until the surrogate is at the correct stage of her menstrual cycle
to accept the embryo. 29
2. Egg-Freezing - A Promising Alternative
The most effective and promising alternative to embryo-freezing is egg-
freezing. As is usual in IVF, multiple eggs are removed from the woman for the
possibility of fertilization. But, instead of immediately fertilizing all of the eggs,
the doctor selects one egg for fertilization and immediate implantation, and the
remaining eggs are frozen for possible later use.3 0 Though some eggs may become
unusable in the freezing and thawing process, this is of little moral and ethical
concern because an egg alone is not yet a human being.3 ' Egg-freezing circumvents
moral consequences resulting from the fact that forty to fifty percent of frozen
embryos die during freezing and thawing. 32 Since eggs can be fertilized as needed
for the specific immediate purpose of implantation, egg-freezing avoids the
quandary of what to do with unused embryos.3 3 Freezing eggs is difficult, but
not impossible. As early as 1986, children were born from the egg-freezing
procedure. 3'
B. The Moral and Legal Dilemmas Inherent in In Vitro Fertilization
While artificial conception has benefitted many couples who could not bear
children by traditional means, the next step is to examine the different factual
contexts which present moral and legal dilemmas.
1. The Legal Status of Artificial Conception
The predominant issue from which all others flow is whether it is morally
or legally acceptable to use artificial conception techniques. This question becomes
25. Wurmbrand, supra note 6, at 1085.
26. L. ANDREws, supra note 9, at 257.
27. Id. at 248.
28. Id. at 257.
29. Id. at 254-256.
30. Frozen to Life, supra note 15 (discussion of the egg-freezing process and of an egg bank in
Singapore); Interview: Alan Trounson, Oum, Dec. 1985, at 82, 124-125 [hereinafter Trounson].
31. Trounson, supra note 30, at 126; Frozen to Life, supra note 15, at 88.
32. Trounson, supra note 30, at 124. The process of freezing embryos has been criticized as
riskier than the alternative practice of freezing eggs for later fertilization. Freezing allows doctors to
perform implantation at the best point in the mother's cycle and provides an alternative to destruction
of leftover embryos generated in IVF. Freezing eggs, however, serves these purposes effectively
without creating the enormous ethical problems presented by embryo-freezing. See Grenard, Embryos
in Legal Limbo, MAcLEA~s, July 2, 1984, at 44-46; Bonnicksen, Embryo Freezing: Ethical Issues in
the Clinical Setting, 18 HAsTIos CENTER Rim. 26-30 (Dec. 1988); Ohlendorf, A Small Life's Icy
Beginning, MAcLEAs, May 16, 1983, at 43.
33. Frozen to Life, supra note 15; Trounson, supra note 30.
34. Frozen to Life, supra note 15; Trounson, supra note 30.
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extremely difficult to answer when discussed in the context of embryos which
are unwanted because they are abnormal, orphaned or for some other reason
left without a womb in which to grow. This issue is discussed in depth in Part
III.
2. Acts Harmful to the Embryo
Many contracts or policies made by IVF clinics permit acts which are directly
harmful to a human embryo. For example, many clinics require couples to sign
a contract with the clinic before acceptance into the program. The contract
typically allows the couple to choose between the destruction of the embryos
which are not implanted and the donation of the embryos to another couple."
Although in practice most couples choose the donation option,"6 the mere avail-
ability of the choice to discard the embryos is troubling.
By comparison, some clinics try to avoid the repercussions of discarding
embryos by following a policy of indefinite freezing." 7 Many clinic operators
believe that this policy is safe from attack by pro-life supporters because it
attempts to postpone the decision of whether to discard the embryos. This
treatment indirectly destroys the embryo, however, because the frozen embryo
deteriorates over time to a point at which it can no longer survive implantation. s
Although this note does not discuss in detail human embryo experimentation,
commercial sale of embryos, or eugenics,3 9 these practices do occur. While only
a minority of states have enacted laws which exclude or limit experimentation on
human embryos, 40 some scientists believe that their research on embryos should
not be restricted. 41
35. Hundley, supra note 22, at 25, col. 3. Individual clinics use a wide variety of contractual
terms in their IVF agreements with patients. For example, the Cleveland Clinic Foundation's standard
contract asks the couple to choose between the clinic destroying the embryos or donating them to
an anonymous donor in the event of a divorce. The IVF program at Mt. Sinai Hospital Medical
Center in Chicago has an underlying principle that the embryos are the couple's property. Mt. Sinai
also gives couples the same two choices in the event of a divorce as the Cleveland Clinic. In contrast,
Detroit's Hutzel Hospital has no contractual option for the destruction of embryos. Instead, in the
event of a divorce, the hospital gives custody of the embryos to the wife or, if she does not want
them, to an infertile couple. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Ozar, The Case Against Thawing Unused Frozen Embryos, 15 HASTiNoS CENTER REP. 7, 9
(Aug. 1985). See also Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496 (Equity Division I Sept. 21, 1989) (LEXIS, Tenn
library, Cases file).
39. Eugenics concerns the belief that the human species can be improved through selective
breeding. This idea has actually been introduced into practice at the Repository for Germinal Choice.
This clinic in Escondido, California, opened in 1980 by Robert Graham, has attempted to use sperm
donated by Nobel prize winners to create superior embryos. Friedrich, "A Legal Moral, Social
Nightmare", Tpra, Sept. 10, 1984, at 56. See Bray, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property
Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEx. L. Rav. 209 (Nov. 1990) (advocates creation of legal property right
in human bodies; discusses sale of embryos).
40. The following states have enacted legislation (including criminal sanctions) which restricts
fetal research: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of
the New Reproduction Technologies, 70 A.B.A. J. 50, 54-55 (Aug. 1984).
41. Friedrich, supra note 39, at 56. Scientists who believe that embryo experimentation should
not be restricted argue that such experimentation could lead to a vast array of medical knowledge
that might be beneficial to society. Wurmbrand, supra note 6, at 1095 n.l10.
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3. Custody Battles Between Egg Donor, Sperm Donor, Gestational Mother
and/or Medical Institutions
Much of the legal debate concerning the status of frozen human embryos
has been centered around custody issues. These can arise when two married
people who went through the IVF procedure are fighting each other for custody,
42
fighting together against a third party such as the IVF clinic 4 3 or have died, thus
leaving an orphaned frozen embryo." As discussed earlier, some clinics present
options to the couple regarding the fate of the embryo should the couple divorce
or die while an embryo is still frozen.4 The couple is required to select one of
these options before the clinic creates the embryo. The contracts in such cases,
however, do not usually spell out who will have control of the embryos.
This issue was raised in York v. Jones," in which Risa and Steven York
challenged the IVF clinic which fertilized and froze their embryos. 47 After having
one of their embryos frozen at the Howard and Georgeanna Jones Institute for
Reproduction Medicine ("Jones Institute") in Norfolk, Virginia," the couple
decided to have the embryo implanted at a clinic in California (where they were
moving) because it was more convenient and had a higher success rate of
pregnancy.49 The Jones Institute, however, insisted that the embryos be implanted
at their clinic and refused to surrender them.
In perhaps the most notorious case, Davis v. Davis,0 a married couple
divorced and then fought among themselves for control of their frozen embryos.
This case has received extensive media coverage because of the seven frozen
embryos created by the couple during their marriage. The conflict arose because
Mary Sue Davis wanted custody of the embryos so that the couple's original
intent, implantation and pregnancy, could be achieved.5" The father, Junior
Davis, argued that the embryos should remain frozen indefinitely. Mr. Davis
claimed that, because the couple was divorced, he did not want to become the
biological father of any child which might result from implantation of those
frozen embryos in Mary Sue Davis's uterus. 52
4. Fate of Orphaned Embryos
In a more tragic case, a Los Angeles couple, Mario and Elsa Rios, went to
the Queen Victoria Medical Center in Melbourne, Australia to have Mrs. Rios'
eggs fertilized with sperm from an anonymous donor. 3 Some of the embryos
were implanted in Mrs. Rios, and the remaining two were frozen and kept at
42. See infra notes 50-52, 119-130 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 46-49, 131-135 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
46. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
47. Id. at 422.
48. Id. at 423, 424.
49. Milloy, 7 Embryos in Divorce Tug-of-War, New York Newsday, Aug. 6, 1989, at 15.
50. No. E-14496 (Equity Division I Sept. 21, 1989) (LEXIS, Tenn library, Cases file).
51. Smothers, Tennessee Judge Awards Custody of 7 Embryos to Woman, N.Y. Times, Sept.
22, 1989, at A13, col. 1.
52. Milloy, supra note 49.
53. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 267.
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the clinic. 4 The implants failed, and the couple later died in an airplane crash
in Chile, in the spring of 1983.11 The question remained: who is to decide what
to do with the remaining orphaned frozen embryos and what options are legally
available?
5 6
The Rios case raises yet another complex legal issue concerning probate law
and inheritance. The common law rule is that an unborn child can inherit under
intestacy statutes if his or her parent(s) left no will, provided that the child was
conceived before the decedent(s) died. 7 Where the fertilized egg has been frozen,
as in the Rios case, however, the law does not say whether a child which results
from the frozen embryo being thawed and implanted may inherit from the
deceased parents regardless of when the child is born. As William Salmond states:
"[t]here is nothing in the law to prevent a man from owning property before he
is born. His ownership is contingent, for he may never be born at all, but it is
nonetheless a real and present ownership .... A posthumous child, for example,
may inherit .... 58
II. HISTORY OF THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE EMBRYO
When artificial conception was new, there was little practical anticipation of
the many conflicts which would arise from it. In spite of the controversy,5 9 IVF
is legal,60 and so is the process of freezing embryos, which has brought with it
several new moral and legal issues. 6' The following is a sampling of the insufficient
statutory and case law which touches on these issues.
A. Statutory Review
1. United States
To date, federal and state legislatures have been virtually silent on issues
affecting pre-implanted embryos, with the exception of some legislation dealing
54. Friedrich, supra note 39, at 56.
55. Id.
56. The Waller Committee produced a report in August 1984 which recommended that the Rios
embryos be destroyed. However, the legislature of the state of Victoria rejected this advice and
passed the Infertility (Medical Procedures) Bill in October 1984 which called for an attempt to have
the embryos implanted in a surrogate mother. There has been no further word on the actual outcome
of the Rios' embryos. Ozar, supra note 38, at 7.
57. J. DUKEhMNIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLs, TRusTs, AND ESTATES 109 (1984).
58. W. SALMOND, JuIUSPRUDENCE (12th ed. 1966). See generally Ozar, supra note 38, at 7
(proposing that if embryos are more than just property, they must be treated so, regardless of who
has or has not died).
59. See generally Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L.
REv. 437; TEST-TUBE BABEs, (W.A.W. Walters & P. Singer eds. 1982); C. GROBSTEiN, FROM CHANcE
To PuuosE: AN APPFRA1 OF ExTERNAL HuMAN FERTaZATION (1981); Iglesias, In Vitro Fertilization:
The Major Issues, 10 J. MED. ETmics (1984) (all forms of fertilization other than intercourse are
profoundly unnatural and immoral); Richards, Invasion of the Body Snatchers, NEW STATESMAN,
July 5, 1985, at 23-25 (discusses IVF, surrogate motherhood, and embryo experimentation in Great
Britain).
60. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-.211 (1985). The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society
concluded that "in vitro fertilization [is an] ethically acceptable practice." Postell, Establishing
Guidelines for Artificial Conception, TmiAL, Nov. 1986, at 93-95.
61. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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mostly with embryo experimentation and research.6 Neither federal nor state
governments have enumerated the legal rights of a frozen embryo and its parents. 3
In the United States, following the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe
v. Wade," many state legislatures passed laws restricting research on fetuses to
maintain respect for human dignity.," Because many of these laws define the
term fetus to include an embryo or any product of conception, these laws may
apply to such practices as IVF, embryo transfer, and embryo freezing." Although
these statutes were not specifically designed to prohibit artificial conception and
transfer of embryos, they can be interpreted as prohibiting such conduct, since
these procedures might be considered experimental and provide no clear and
immediate therapeutic benefit to the embryo. 67
Many states have enacted laws which restrict fetal research only when it is
done prior to an anticipated abortion, subsequent to the actual abortion, or on
a fetus which exhibits characteristics which are present only at such an advanced
state that it must have been already present in the woman's uterus." Such laws
would not apply to IVF or freezing of embryos. Broader statutes however, can
be interpreted to forbid IVF.69 In any event, these laws should be updated to
specifically cover advancements in medical technology. Without new laws, prac-
titioners in some states are uncertain of their potential criminal and civil liability
if an IVF procedure or cryopreservation of an embryo fails.
70
Illinois law illustrates how a statute can be ambiguous and subject to more
than one interpretation. In Smith v. Hartigan'7' the plaintiffs, an infertile couple
and their physician, challenged the constitutionality of a provision of the Illinois
Abortion Law of 1975.72 The statute read:
62. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-211 (1985) (including statutes involving review of IVF
procedures by an Institutional Review Board and regulating the safety of IVF). Michigan has restricted
experimentation and research on live embryos. Andrews, supra note 40, at 51. An Illinois statute
criminalizes neglect of an embryo, once it is created. Note, Reproductive Technology and the
Procreative Rights of the Unmarried, 98 HAv. L. Re. 669, 672 (1985) (citing Smith v. Hartigan,
556 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ill. 1983)). In addition, the Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare has
issued a report on IVF and embryo transfer: Ethics Advisory Board, Report and Conclusions: HEW
Support of Research Involving Human In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer (May 4, 1979).
A state may prohibit experimentation on any living human conceptus. See, e.g., MiN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145.422 (West 1989).
63. For the purposes of this note, "parents" or "natural parents" refers to the egg and sperm
donor in external fertilization.
64. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
65. Andrews, supra note 40, at 50.
66. Id. For example, Minnesota prohibits experimentation on a living human conceptus and
defines a human conceptus as "any human organism, conceived either in the human body or produced
in an artificial environment other than the human body, from fertilization through the first 265 days
thereafter." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.421-.422 (West 1989).
67. Andrews, supra note 40, at 51.
68. Id. For example, Ohio prohibits experimentation on the product of human conception which
is aborted. Omuo Rav. CODE AN. § 2919.14 (Anderson 1987).
69. Andrews, supra note 40, at 51. For example, Minnesota prohibits research on any human
conceptus unless verifiable scientific evidence has shown such research to be harmless to the conceptus.
Mni. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West 1989).
70. Friedrich, supra note 39, at 54.
71. 556 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
72. Illinois Abortion Act of 1975, P.A. 78-225 (codified as amended at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
81-21 to 81-35 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1989)).
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Any person who intentionally causes the fertilization of a human ovum by a
human sperm outside the body of a living human female shall, with regard to
the human being thereby produced, be deemed to have the care and custody of
a child for the purposes of Section 4 of the Act to Prevent and Punish Wrongs
to Children, approved May 17, 1877, as amended .... 71
The plaintiff, an Illinois physician, challenged the statute because it prevented
him from performing IVF for an infertile couple. 74 The court avoided the complex
legal and moral issues by ruling that the action failed to present a case or
controversy because the defendants, the State's Attorney and the Attorney Gen-
eral, both had interpreted the statute as not prohibiting the IVF procedure and
represented that the plaintiffs would not be prosecuted if they proceeded. 75
In response to that ruling, the Illinois Legislature passed an amendment in
1985 which rewrote section 6(7) of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975 to say:
No person shall sell or experiment upon a fetus produced by the fertilization of
a human ovum by a human sperm unless such experimentation is therapeutic to
the fetus thereby produced. Intentional violation of this section is a Class A
misdemeanor. Nothing in this subsection (7) is intended to prohibit the perform-
ance of in vitro fertilization.
7
6
Although this new law expressly allows IVF, it fails to address the freezing of
embryos. It may be argued, however, that the freezing procedure falls within the
definition of "experiment." Because cryopreservation is not necessarily therapeu-
tic, it may nevertheless be prohibited by the statute.
2. Australia - A Leader in Embryo Legislation
Australia has been the world leader in legislation addressing IVF ever since
that country was faced with the controversy surrounding the Rios case. 77 Exam-
ination of the laws that two Australian states have enacted, and their criticisms,
provides an insightful starting point for other legislative bodies seeking to enact
similar laws.
In 1984, the State of Victoria introduced the Infertility (Medical Procedures)
Bill which was the first attempt in a common law country to regulate IVF
programs. 78 The Victorian Parliament finally passed the bill in October 1984 after
much debate and controversy. Major provisions of the Infertility (Medical Pro-
cedures) Act of 1984 are:
1) Establishment of a Standing Review and Advisory Committee consisting
of people from a variety of backgrounds (philosophy, medical science, religion,
social work, law, and education) which would advise the Minister for Health in
relation to infertility and procedures for alleviating infertility;
79
73. 1984 Ill. Laws 1001 (current version at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 81-26 § 6(7) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1989)).
74. 556 F. Supp. at 159.
75. Id. at 164.
76. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 81-26 § 6(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989).
77. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
78. Keenan, supra note 4, at 489.
79. VICT. AcTs, Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act of 1984 § 29(1).
1990]
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2) The Committee shall respect the principle that childless couples should be
assisted in fulfilling their desire to have children;s°
3) The Committee shall ensure that the highest regard is given to the principle
that human life shall be preserved and protected at all times;8'
4) A complete ban on cloning and interspecies mixing of gametes;
2
5) A ban on the fertilization of ova outside of the body except for purposes
of future implantation of those resulting embryos;
3
6) A complete ban on any experimental procedure (defined as research on
an embryo which would cause damage to the embryo, make the embryo unfit
for implantation, or reduce the prospects of a pregnancy resulting from the
implantation of the embryo) not specifically approved by this Act or the Standing
Review and Advisory Committee;84
7) A ban on freezing embryos unless it is carried out for the purposes of
future implantation in a woman's womb;85
8) Permission for research on techniques for freezing and storing ova removed
from the body of a woman;
6
9) Provision requiring specific application and licensing procedures for a
hospital or clinic seeking approval from Minister;8
10) A requirement that if an embryo cannot be implanted in the original
woman's body because of death or accident, and if both persons who produced
the gametes consent, then the embryo be made available, in accordance with the
gamete donors' plan, to another woman for implantation. If consents cannot be
obtained because the persons are dead or cannot be found, the IVF hospital shall
make the embryo available for implantation in another woman;8
11) A complete ban on all forms of commercial surrogacy and makes
volunteer surrogacy agreements nonenforceable; 9 and
12) Penalties for violation of each provision of the Act of one to four years
imprisonment. 90
Thie passage of this Act was met with serious debate and challenges, including
the passage of the Infertility (Medical Procedures) (Amendment) Act of 1987. 91
This amendment, as well as removing minor ambiguities in the law, was primarily
passed to clear up any uncertainty surrounding the term "embryo." The amend-
ment, recognizing that fertilization is a process which lasts about twenty-two
hours,92 allows research to be done "involving the fertilization of a human ovum
80. Id. § 29(7)(a).
81. Id. § 29(7)(b).
82. Id. § 6(2).
83. Id. § 6(5).
84. Id. § 6(3),(4).
85. Id. § 6(6),(7).
86. Id. § 6(8).
87. Id. § 7.
88. Id. § 14.
89. Id. § 30.
90. Id. § 1-34.
91. Vicr. ACTS, Infertility (Medical Procedures) (Amendment) Act of 1987.
92. Kasimba, The South Australian Reproductive Technology Act of 1988, 62 LAW INST. J. 728,
730 (Aug. 1988).
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from the point of sperm penetration prior to but not including the point of
syngamy."
93
After four years of observing the IVF laws enacted by the State of Victoria,
the State of South Australia passed its own version of that law with the hope
that it had learned from Victoria's mistakes. In March of 1988, the South
Australian Parliament passed the Reproductive Technology Act of 1988. 94 Similar
to the Victoria act, it sets up a Council on Reproductive Technology to "issue
and keep under review a 'code of ethical practice' (the "Code") for IVF and
experimentation on human reproductive material.'' 9 The Act also mandates that
the Code must prohibit embryo flushing (which is not defined)96 and that "persons
for whom embryos are cryopreserved have to retain the right to decide the
embryos' fate and to be able to review such decision within every twelve
months.'' 97 Finally, the Act also establishes criteria for clinics to be licensed and
approved to practice IVF procedures. 9
Criticism of South Australia's attempt to legislate IVF and related practices
has centered around the definitions of such key terms as "reproductive technol-
ogy," "artificial fertilization," and "embryo."" In addition, the 1988 Act seems
to apply equally to a human embryo, ovum, and semen, 1'0 appearing to require
that a person be licensed under the Act to do research involving experimentation
on either sperm or ova.' 0'
B. Case Law Review
Judges complain that they have virtually no guidance for resolving embryo
issues. They do not know whether to apply constitutional law, criminal law,
property law, family law, or contract law.' 2 Many judges acknowledge that
intuition plays a large role in their bioethical decisions for which they have no
legislative guidance. 0 3 The cases described below provide a starting point for
understanding embryo-related common law.
1. United States Supreme Court Law
The Supreme Court has indirectly addressed the issues which affect frozen
embryos through its decisions in Roe v. Wade'04 and the more recent case of
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,105 both involving the constitutionality
of state abortion legislation. The majority in Roe held that any state statute
93. VICT. ACTS, Infertility (Medical Procedures) (Amendment) Act of 1987 § 9A(l). The Amend-
ment also defines syngamy as "the alignment on the mitutic spindle of the chromosomes derived
from the pronuclei." Id. § (4)(d).
94. S. AusTL. AcTs, Reproductive Technology Act of 1988.
95. Kasimba, supra note 92, at 728.
96. Id. (citing S. Ausm. ACTS, Reproduction Technology Act of 1988 § 10(3)).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 730.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Steinfels, Judges Anguish Over Medical Issues, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1989, § A, at 19, col.
103. Id.
104. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
105. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
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which criminalizes abortions which are not necessary to save the mother's life
violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 1°6 The basis for this
decision was the Court's precedent that the fourteenth amendment's concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action imply a right of personal
privacy.107 The Court held that this privacy right encompasses a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."
The Court explicitly refrained from deciding when life begins:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those
trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are
unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development
of man's knowledge is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.' 9
The Court continued "[wlith respect to the state's important and legitimate
interest in potential life, the compelling point is at viability. This is so because
the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the
mother's womb." 0
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court modified and narrowed Roe in
Webster."' Webster held, inter alia, that the preamble of a Missouri statute did
not violate the Constitution by including "findings" by the state legislature that
"[tihe life of each human being begins at conception.""12 This reiterates the
holding in Maher v. Roe"3 to the same effect and clears the way for state
legislatures and judiciaries to declare such findings as they relate to both implanted
embryos and implicitly to frozen embryos. Webster reconsidered the Roe trimester
framework on the grounds that it proved "unsound in principle and unworkable
in practice,""14 although the Court was quick to note that it was not overruling
Roe."5 The Court held that "there is no reason why the State's compelling
interest in protecting potential human life should not extend throughout pregnancy
106. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
107. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)).
108. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
109. Id. at 159.
110. Id. at 163. A definition of viability which was accepted in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 62-65 (1979) was "that stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child
may be continued indefinitely outside of the womb by natural or artificial life-support systems." 428
U.S. at 63 (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.015(6) (1974)).
111. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058.
112. Id. at 3042, referring to Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205.2. There have been conflicting interpretations
of Roe, regarding whether it invalidates any legislation which contains a conclusive presumption that
life begins at the moment of conception. For example, a U.S. District Court found certain Rhode
Island statutes to be unconstitutional because of such a conclusive presumption. Doe v. Israel, 358
F. Supp. 1193 (D. R.I. 1973) (referring to R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-3-1 - 11-3-5). The court held that
Roe precluded such a presumption, as well as the presumption that a fetus is a "person" within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Id. However, the United States Supreme Court put this
question to rest in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). The Court emphasized that Roe "implies no
limitation on the authority of a state to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion."
Maher, 432 U.S. at 474. It follows that a state may enact frozen embryo legislation which finds that
human life begins at conception.
113. 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
114. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3056 (quoting a phrase from Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985)).
115. Webster, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3058.
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rather than coming into existence only at the point of viability."1 6 The plurality
added that "we do not see why . . . there should therefore be a rigid line allowing
state regulation after viability, but prohibiting it before viability."', This concern
for pre-viable life is important to the embryo.
It is difficult to extract from Webster a definite principle applicable to frozen
embryos. Nonetheless, Webster clearly shows that the Supreme Court is becoming
increasingly willing to permit each state to legislate according to its own theory
of when life begins." ' Webster implied a higher degree of respect for young
human life than Roe by resolving up some of the ambiguity surrounding the
states' rights to restrict abortion. This trend is important to states that are
attempting to enact legislation to protect unborn life, which will not be held
unconstitutional.
2. State Case Law
State courts have had little opportunity to address embryo-related questions.
In deciding the Davis"' 9 embryo custody case, a Tennessee trial court expressly
held that "human life begins at conception," and that "the common law doctrine
of parens patriae controls children, in vitro."'" The Knoxville, Tennessee IVF
clinic apparently did not require a contractual agreement that would have decided
the fate of any excess embryos upon the couple's divorce.' 2' Furthermore, the
courts lacked any contractual terms on which to base their opinions and had no
direct legal precedent to follow.
The trial court awarded Mary Sue Davis temporary custody of the embryos,
for the purpose of implantation, to protect the children's best interest and to
give them the chance to be born. 22 The court ruled that the embryos were human
beings, not property, 23 since "the cells of human embryos are comprised of
differentiated cells, unique in character and specialized to the highest degree of
distinction."'' Thus, the court concluded that 'human life begins at the moment
of conception [and] that Mr. and Mrs. Davis have accomplished their original
intent to produce a human being to be known as their child.' ' 25 Thereafter, the
court treated the case like a typical custody dispute, finding that "it is to the
manifest best interest of the children, in vitro, that they be made available for
116. Id. at 3044.
117. Id. at 3057. David Ozar notes that the viability standard is particularly unworkable in the
context of unused frozen embryos. Ozar, supra note 38, at 8-9.
118. Changes in the U.S. Supreme Court over time will most likely cause changes in the laws
regarding the rights of the unborn. If the Court continues the trend it started from Roe to Webster,
the law may ultimately evolve to the point where unborn persons, including frozen embryos, will
enjoy constitutional protection.
119. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496 (Equity Division I Sept. 21, 1989) (LEXIS, Tenn library, Cases
file).
120. Id. at 2. Junior Davis appealed this decision, which was remanded in Davis v. Davis, No.
180 (Tenn. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (WESTLAW, TN-CS).
121. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496 (Equity Division I Sept. 21, 1989) (LEXIS, Tenn library, Cases
file) at 8-9 ("the parties made no decision about [the matter of what would become of unused
embryos]").
122. Id. at 2, 37.
123. Id. at 2.
124. Id. at 27.
125. Id. at 30 (footnote omitted).
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implantation to assure their opportunity for live birth; implantation is their sole
and only hope for survival."' 26
Since that decision, Mary Sue and Junior Davis have both remarried, and
Mary Sue says she no longer is interested in implanting the embryos, but wants
to donate them to another childless couple.1 7 Nonetheless, Junior Davis appealed
the decision. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee stated that "the sole issue on
appeal is essentially who is entitled to control [the embryos].'' l The court remanded
the cause to the trial court to "enter a judgment vesting Mary Sue and Junior
with joint control of the fertilized ova and with equal voice over their disposi-
tion."' 129 The ultimate fate of the embryos is not yet known. The Tennessee
Supreme Court has agreed to hear Mary Sue Stowe's appeal from the Court of
Appeals decision, and the case is expected to appear on the May, 1991 docket. 30
In the York "kidnapping case,"' 131 administrators at the Jones Institute relied
on an existing contract to try to prove that the clinic deserved custody of the
embryo. The clinic's interpretation of the contract was that if implantation of
the embryo in Risa York did not take place there, then the embryo should either
remain part of the clinic's study, be donated to an infertile couple, or be allowed
to expire in the clinic. 32 In addition, the clinic claimed that transporting the
frozen embryo would risk possible thawing or ransom demands by the courier.
33
The Jones Institute contended that it was simply protecting its legal interests by
refusing to release the frozen embryo to the Yorks.1
34
The couple sued in federal court for custody of the embryo and damages
for unlawful retention, claiming breach of contract, quasi-contract, detinue, and
violation of federal civil rights. The district judge rejected the defendant's motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, instead finding that the plaintiffs' complaint
contained valid claims based on the existence of a bailor-bailee relationship. The
judge reasoned that "Itihe essential nature of a bailment relationship imposes on
the bailee, when the purpose of the bailment has terminated, an absolute
obligation to return the subject matter of the bailment to the bailor.' 131 Shortly
after this ruling, the parties settled the claim out-of-court and the Yorks removed
their frozen embryo from the Jones Institute.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Does the Probability of Unwanted Embryos Call for Prohibition of
Artificial Conception?
At this point, it is necessary to analyze in depth the questions which will
shape the states' laws regarding embryos. Professor John A. Robertson 36 has
126. Id. at 37.
127. Davis v. Davis, No. 180 (Tenn. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (WESTLAW, TN-CS) n.l.
128. Id. at 1.
129. Id. at 3.
130. Telephone interview with Court Clerk, Knoxville Division, Tenn. Sup. Ct. (Feb. 12, 1991).
See also Stowe v. Davis (Tenn. Sup. Ct. Dec. 3, 1990) (1990 Tenn. LEXIS 466) (LEXIS Tenn.
library, Tenn. file) (granting appeal); Curriden, Joint Custody of the Frozen Seven, 76 A.B.A. J. 36
(Dec. 1990).
131. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). See also Bonnicksen, supra note 1, at 1.
132. Milloy, supra note 49.
133. Id.
134. Bonnicksen, supra note 1.
135. 717 F. Supp. at 425 (citing 8 Am. JuR. 2D Bailments § 178 (1980)).
136. Baker and Botts Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin.
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divided "the new reproduction" into five important sets of issues. 13 7 These issues
deserve contemplation and have spawned much discussion, however, this note
will only address the issues surrounding the independent moral status of the pre-
implanted embryo and the right to noncoital reproduction.
The underlying issue is whether artificial conception should be legal. First,
the low success rate of implantation guarantees that the °majority of embryos
created in the process will die at some point before birth, 38 especially during the
freezing and thawing process. 139 Second, the process is expensive and is accused
of benefitting only high-income couples. 4' Third, the process raises concerns that
reproductive technologies and genetic engineering will reach uncontrollable pro-
portions. 41 We will analyze this issue in the context of the worst-case scenario-
what will become of embryos which are "unfit" or unwanted for implantation?
At the outset, we note that many embryos created in vitro are rendered
abnormal by the process, and have a high risk of resulting in ectopic pregnancies,
being born with a low birth weight, or being spontaneously aborted. 42 Regardless
of how the law treats such embryos, there is the potential for very undesirable
results. If society cannot find an acceptable answer to this question, we must
consider the possibility of prohibiting artificial conception altogether.
1. Artificial Conception Prohibited
One possibility is for legislatures to prohibit artificial conception in an
attempt to prevent the dilemma of what to do with abnormal or otherwise
unwanted embryos. The disadvantage is that this would clearly be undesirable
137. Robertson, supra note 20, at 953. The first issue is the new meaning of reproduction for
individuals when different aspects of it are isolated and recombined. This includes the question of
whether procreative liberty gives persons and couples the right to acquire children noncoitally. The
second set of issues asks whether or not the embryo has independent moral status. The third set of
issues concerns the physical and psychosocial welfare of children born as a result of IVF, and the
appropriateness or inappropriateness of parental selection of offspring characteristics. A fourth issue
is whether or not the third party donation of eggs, sperm, embryos, or gestation changes the family
drastically enough to justify regulation. The fifth set of issues involves the threat which noncoital
reproduction may possibly pose to relations of men and women to each other and to the natural
order. See generally The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium: Genetics and the Law, 39 EMORY L.J.
619 (1990) [hereinafter Thrower Symposium].
138. Alan Trounson told an interviewer that the IVF success rate is about 20 percent. Trounson,
supra note 30, at 124. It would be difficult to outlaw IVF on the basis of its low success rate,
because of the fundamental right to procreative liberty. Consider, for example, a woman who wants
to conceive naturally, but whose doctor has told her that she only has a 50% chance of carrying to
term. If a law forbade her from attempting to have a baby, in spite of the odds, it would never
pass strict scrutiny because of the Supreme Court's protection of procreative rights. See supra note
107 and accompanying text. It is difficult to draw a line between the rights of such a hypothetical
woman and the rights of a woman who wants to attempt external fertilization.
139. See supra note 32.
140. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. See also GRoasTEn, supra note 59.
141. For some discussion of the prospect of sending frozen embryos into space, see Bova, Star
Blazers, Om, Dec. 1984, at 22; Trounson, supra note 30. On genetic engineering, see generally
Attanasio, The Constitutionality of Regulating Human Genetic Engineering: Where Procreative Liberty
and Equal Opportunity Collide, 53 U. Cm. L. Rv. 1274 (Fall 1986); Attanasio, The Genetic
Revolution: What Lawyers Don't Know, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 662 (June 1988); Thrower Symposium,
supra note 137; Y.M. Ciwris, CoNmoaNmo TacmqoLooy: GENETiC ENOINEERING AND THE LAW
(1980); A. HuxLEY, BRAvE NEW WORLD (1932) (fictional account of mass-produced human beings).
142. Rowland, Technology and Motherhood: Reproductive Choice Reconsidered, 12 SiGNS: JOuR-
NAL OF WOMEN IN CuLTuRE AND SocirY 520 (1987).
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for persons who cannot conceive naturally. It is also likely that if such a state
law passed, it would be found unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court, which is protective of the procreative rights of citizens. 43
In addition, legislatures must deal with unwanted or orphaned embryos which
may be illegally created and those which were created before prohibition. If an
embryo is a human being, as the authors contend, then the law should prohibit
its destruction. If a state prohibits destruction, it must be sure not to violate the
Supreme Court's prevailing doctrine on pre-born life. This doctrine is difficult
to ascertain in this context because the Supreme Court has never directly declared
the status of nonimplanted embryos. This lack of definition is discussed at length
in subsection C. Although the authors believe that existing abortion law does not
apply to artificially created or transferred embryos while outside the womb, and
it is debatable whether it applies to those already implanted, we must anticipate
that courts may hold to the contrary. If so, it may be legal to destroy an embryo
before implantation.
Additionally, if the embryo statute forces an egg-donor to implant, and
abortion remains legal,'" then a law-abiding woman who does not want to give
birth to her embryo can implant the embryo and abort it later. Obviously, this
would be a ridiculous exercise. Women who refuse to go through that exercise
cannot be physically forced to implant the embryos they have created.
The only feasible enforcement mechanism for mandatory implantation is to
impose a fine or even a jail term on those who disobey the mandate. This may
or may not have a deterrent effect on those who contemplate artificial conception
on their own terms. Fines and jail terms, however, do not provide homes for
embryos. Perhaps, some women would decide to give birth to their embryos
anyway, and risk having children who are handicapped or unable to be born
normally, 45 which is also an undesirable result.
Therefore, a law which requires a woman to implant an embryo which she
no longer wants to implant should not be passed unless there is a change in the
Supreme Court's abortion law. Even if such a law were passed, it would likely
create more problems than it solved.
If legislation provides that implantation is not mandatory, people will have
the legal ability to create embryos and kill them as they see fit. People will be
able to pick and choose the embryos which they like the best and discard the
rest.'" As science progresses, it may become possible to identify the "blue-eyed"
embryo and simply flush the others. While this proposition appears morally and
socially repugnant, even prohibition of artificial conception is not an easy solution
to the problems discussed.
2. Artificial Conception Remains Legal
The second possibility is to keep IVF legal, as it is now. 47 Again, if
implantation is mandatory and abortion is legal, then women who no longer
143. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
144. Webster, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3058 (1989).
145. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
146. See generally sources supra note 141.
147. See supra note 60.
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want to give birth will either disobey the law and refuse to implant, or implant
and later abort.'" Some women might unwillingly implant and give birth to
handicapped babies. 49 The same would be true if abortion were not legal.
If IVF is legal, and implantation is not mandatory, then, again, people could
take human life for any reason, and kill all embryos which appear to be less
than "perfect."' 50 This is both undesirable and frightening.,
We realize that there are no easy answers, but we hope that legislatures will
consider the fate of unwanted embryos when drafting legislation. This note
accepts the probability that IVF will continue to be legal.
B. An Embryo is Protected Human Life at Conception
As the abortion issue emphasizes, there is great controversy over the legal
status of prenatal life.15' The factual situations which we deal with here, however,
can only be resolved after answering this key question: Is a pre-implanted
5 2
embryo an individual human life worthy of legal protection? We answer that it
is.
1. Findings of Dr. Lejeune and Other Experts
In Davis, Judge W. Dale Young,' the presiding judge at the trial, defined
embryonic life created by IVF as human. In his opinion, "[t]he answer then, to
the question: When does human life begin? ... [is] that human life begins at
the moment of conception." 11 4 One basis for this decision was the testimony of
four expert witnesses'55 that cryopreserved embryos are human. 5 6 Dr. Lejeune
referred to an embryo as "that youngest form of a being,"' 17 and expressed the
idea that each human has a unique beginning which occurs at the moment of
conception. In the court's words, Dr. Lejeune testified that
[wihen the ovum is fertilized by the sperm, the result is 'the most specialized cell
under the sun .. .;' specialized from the point of view that no other cell will
ever have the same instructions in the life of the individual being created. No
148. See supra notes 143-146 and accompanying text.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Members of Congress have attempted to rally support for a constitutional amendment which
states that life begins at conception. Bonnicksen, supra note 1, at 4. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-325
(1985), in which the members of the legislature "expressly deplore the destruction of the unborn
human lives which has and will occur in Nebraska as a consequence of the United States Supreme
Court's decision on abortion of January 22, 1973." NEB. RaV. STAT. § 28-325 (1985). See generally
C. RICE, BEYOND ABORTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE SECULAR STATE (1979); THE ETiics
OF ABORTION, (R. Baird & S. Rosenbaum eds. 1989); J. NOONAN, THE MORALITY OF ABORTION
(1970).
152. Wurmbrand, supra note 6, at 1092.
153. Circuit Judge, Fifth Judicial District, Tennessee.
154. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496 (Equity Division I Sept. 21, 1989) (LEXIS, Tenn library, Cases
file) at 30.
155. The expert witnesses were: Dr. King, a medical doctor and specialist in infertility/reproductive
endocrinology; Dr. Shivers, an embryologist experienced in lab work for IVF and cryogenic storage
of human embryos; Professor John Robertson, a law professor who has written about non-coital
reproduction; and Dr. Jerome Lejeune, a medical doctor, doctor in science, and professor of
fundamental genetics, specializing in human genetics. Id. at 12-13.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 14.
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scientist has ever offered the opinion that an embryo is property. As soon as he
has been conceived, a man is a man.'
The Davis Court concluded that "the cells of human embryos are comprised of
differentiated cells, unique in character and specialized to the highest degree of
distinction.'1 9 This conclusion was based on Dr. Lejeune's testimony regarding
DNA manipulation of the molecules of human chromosomes, which was unre-
butted,160 and corroborated by the Florida District Court of Appeals.16'
2. Separability Not a Prerequisite for Human Individuality
The New York State Appellate Division recognized that one important issue
affecting the rights of the unborn is the separability of the unborn from its
parent(s).Ya If an embryo is merely the mother's tissue, without its own identity,
it would not make sense to assert that it has rights. But an embryo is more than
that, as noted by the court:
[L]egal separability should begin where there is biological separability .... what
we know makes it possible to demonstrate clearly that separability begins at
conception.... That [the fetus] may not live if its protection and nourishment
are cut off earlier than the viable stage of its development is not to destroy its
separability; it is rather to describe the conditions under which life will not
continue. 16
Just as one would not argue that a one-year-old baby is not a unique,
individual human being with the right to life,' simply because it is completely
dependent upon its caregiver[s] for survival, it is absurd to make such an argument
about pre-implanted life. An externally-created embryo is even more "separable"
than the implanted fetus that was at issue in the New York State Appellate
Division's holding. Therefore, such an embryo has "legal separability" and its
own independent moral status which must be protected, 65 despite its dependent
qualities.
3. Ensoulment
Those who believe that every human being has a soul which distinguishes
him or her from other humans, from animals, and from vegetable life' have
answered the question of when human life begins with "whenever the human
soul unites with the 'body.""' 167 Ensoulment is a very powerful criterion for
158. Id. at 15.
159. Id. at 27.
160. Id. at 26.
161. Id. at n.39 (citing Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1988)).
162. Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (1953).
163. Id.
164. Although infanticide was at one time pervasive in Western Europe, it has always been
condemned by moralists, jurists, and criminologists. R. SHERLOCK, PRESERVING LIFE: PUBLIC POLICY
AND THB LIn NOT WORTH LrviNo 75-116 (1987).
165. Wurmbrand, supra note 6, at 1093 ("The freedom to remove a fetus from a woman's body,
as outlined by Roe, does not give her control over an embryo which is not physically connected to
her.... The question of what should be done with an embryo or fetus not physically connected to
the mother is a distinct issue.").
166. P.T. DECHARDIN, THE PHENOMENON OF MAN 88-89 (1959).
167. Roe, 410 U.S. at 133 (regarding immediate animation). See also TEST-TUBE BABIES, supra
note 59, at 54; J. RA~zNER & A. BovoNE, INSTRUCTION ON BIOETHICS: RESPECT FOR HUMAN LIF
IN ITS ORoIN AND ON THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION 11, 13-14 (1987).
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protected life, but when is a person ensouled? The Roman Catholic Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith asserts that the human soul is present from the
moment of conception.'"
The argument contends that the most obvious time for God or Nature to
ensoul human beings is the point of conception. It makes sense that Nature
allows the human being's body and soul to be conceived simultaneously. It would
be incongruous to suggest that ensoulment occurs at some arbitrary point in the
being's gradual prenatal development. If a person is ensouled at the time of the
body's conception, then an embryo is a whole human being, even if created
artificially, and the law must protect it accordingly.
4. Embryos Deserve the Benefit of the Doubt
It is difficult to define the beginning of human life to the mutual satisfaction
of scientists, philosophers, clergy, and those in other learned professions, as well
as the general public. Thus, legislators must draft laws without a precise definition
of humanness. It has been argued with great force that, if we are not sure
whether an entity is a human, we should give it the benefit of the doubt. 69
Logically, if harming an embryo may be harming a human being, it should be
illegal, just in case. Our legal system traditionally gives persons the benefit of
the doubt-a strong presumption of innocence-before it deprives them of their
life or liberty. For instance, if we believe that it is most probable that John Doe
committed a crime, but we are not sure beyond a reasonable doubt, we would
not deprive him of his liberty by throwing him in jail. 70 It would be inconsistent,
then, to deprive an embryo of its life or liberty, on the off-chance that it does
not yet possess those qualities which society can comfortably accept as making
it a human being.
A large part of the problem is that there is no generally accepted list of
characteristics which define a "human being." Furthermore, there is no scientific
way to prove that an embryo possesses those qualities which have been suggested
as being determinative. Conversely, there is no proof that an embryo does not
possess those qualities. The mere possibility that an embryo possesses at least the
bare minimum of those qualities which make an entity a human being is enough
to render it deserving of protection. Until it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that an embryo is not a human being at conception, this innocent life should
receive the same benefit of the doubt that accused criminals receive. Legislation
should protect the embryo with its humanness, or at least the probability of its
humanness, in mind.
C. The Position that an Embryo is Protected Human Life is Not Inconsistent
with Existing U.S. Supreme Court Abortion Law
Many state legislatures have expressed their concern for unborn life'7 ' and
fear that Roe v. Wade 72 precludes valuing embryos in human terms, but this is
168. J. RATZINGER & A. BovoNE, supra note 167, at 11, 13-14.
169. TEST-TUBE BABiEs, supra note 59. The probability argument is expressed as follows: "If I
act in a destructive way towards an embryo, where there is a four-out-of-five chance that it will
develop, I would be held blameworthy for taking such a high risk of destroying a human being."
Id. at 55.
170. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
171. See, e.g., NEB. Rav. STAT. § 28-325 ("The Legislature hereby finds and declares: ... [that
1990]
Journal of Legislation
not the case. There are important aspects of Roe and its modifying decision,
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,'7 which indicate that embryos in the
artificial conception setting have protectable rights.
1. Embryo Only Unprotected When Inside Womb of Unwilling Mother
Roe did not decide when human life begins. In fact, Roe held that the states
have an important and legitimate interest in potential life,
74 and Maher v. Roe'7
and Webster 76 explicitly held that state legislatures may declare that human life
begins at conception.'"
In the pre-implanted embryo context, the holding in Roe was very narrow.
When the state's interest in the "potential" human life of a pre-viable entity
competes with the fundamental privacy/procreative right of a woman in whom
that unborn life is implanted, the woman's privacy right prevails. 78 The key
distinction is between an embryo which is implanted and interfering with a
woman's autonomy and an embryo which is not. The Court in Roe simply
applied a balancing test. 79 Although the authors believe that the Court applied
this test incorrectly and therefore authorized the destruction of many unborn
human lives, we do agree that a balancing test is appropriate for the resolution
of such conflicts to prevent people from interfering with each other's rights.
For example, it may be wrong to force a mother whose life is endangered
by her pregnancy to sacrifice her life for the baby's. Nevertheless, if a scientist
plans to perform an experiment which is dangerous to an embryo, just to see
how it will react, the law has a right to force the scientist to forego the experiment,
weighing the embryo's right to live more heavily than the scientist's right to
experiment. In other words, the embryo's rights are not as easily dismissed in
most settings as they are in the abortion setting, where they are pitted against
significant autonomy rights.
Sometimes the embryo's natural parents argue that their procreative freedom
is violated by the possibility that their embryo may be born if they decide after
fertilization that they no longer want to give birth to that child. Nonetheless,
they have no right to destroy the embryo for that reason. Roe says that a woman
has the right to remove a fetus from her womb even if this causes the unavoidable
death of that fetus. This does not imply a right to destroy an embryo which is
separate from her body. Assuming an appropriate woman can carry an embryo
that is unwanted by the natural parent to term,lw° the "parent," who is really
it is] the will of the people of the State of Nebraska and the members of the Legislature to provide
protection for the life of the unborn child whenever possible ....
172. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
173. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
174. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
175. 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
176. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
177. Id. at 3042. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
178. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-164. See Wurmbrand, supra note 6, at 1093.
179. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-164. "Under Roe, a woman's right to an abortion can be viewed solely
as her right to bodily autonomy, or the right to remove the fetus from her body, but not as the
right to destroy the fetus or embryo." Wurmbrand, supra note 6, at 1097.
180. The infertility rate has recently climbed, and there are many couples who are willing to try
adoption. Wurmbrand, supra note 6, at 1079. But the lack of available babies to adopt and the
desire to have lineal descendants have led women to take drastic and painful measures in order to
procreate. Id. For some women, embryo adoption might be an attractive option.
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just an egg or sperm donor, is threatened simply by the idea that he or she has
a child somewhere. This is far less of an intrusion on a woman's privacy than
being required to carry an unwanted fetus to term, and the parents' rights in
such a case are not as arguably fundamental as the interests of pregnant mothers
which are protected by the Court. Therefore, unimplanted embryos are outside
the scope of abortion law and their status is yet to be determined.
2. Abortion Law is Implicitly Limited to Cases of Unintended Conception
At first glance, Roe appears to allow the destruction of unwanted embryos
because it allows a woman to destroy an unborn person whose presence in her
womb interferes with her autonomy. Roe, however, implies that the context
contemplated by the Supreme Court was limited to that of unintended conception,
arising from an accident, rape, or other unplanned scenario. Abortion cases
differ from unwanted, non-implanted embryo cases in that the artificially created
embryo was created voluntarily by adults with the intention of creating a person,
assuming the risks and responsibilities related to conception. Moreover, the
embryo is not yet inside a womb, infringing on the woman's autonomy.
These differences make the artificially created, non-implanted embryo's right
to life more significant than that of the would-be aborted fetus or embryo. The
authors contend, therefore, that Roe is not controlling for cases involving non-
implanted embryos. The Supreme Court's implicit purpose is to protect the right
of a person to make his or her own procreative decisions. This right has been
freely exercised by the parents in an artificial conception scenario.
As discussed in Part II(B), the Webster opinion respects states' rights to
decide for themselves how to classify unborn life, indicating that the Supreme
Court at this time might uphold legislation which affords a degree of respect to
a pre-implanted embryo.
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
Although we would prefer to see federal legislation addressing embryo issues,
we anticipate that individual states will be first to enact such legislation. Therefore,
these guidelines pertain to the drafting and enacting of uniform legislation or
legislation of an individual state, attempting to effectively deal with the rights of
pre-implanted embryos. We recommend that all such issues be addressed in one
bill, which could be entitled the Comprehensive Pre-Implanted Embryo Protection
Act. Such an act should contain provisions that draw from different subject
matters of law, including provisions for criminal sanctions and implications to
family, probate and contract law.
A. Declarations
Three fundamental principles should be declared as a preamble to the act:
(1) human life begins at conception; (2) the legislation balances the embryo's
rights with any competing rights, weighing the embryo highly; and (3) wherever
possible, the law will try to take a preventative approach to bioethical dilemmas.
1. Protectable Human Life Begins at Conception
Ideally, embryo legislation should declare that human life begins at concep-
tion and embryos must, therefore, be legally protected from the moment fertili-
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zation occurs. As discussed, Supreme Court decisions may affect such declarations,
however, we encourage legislatures to do whatever possible to protect embryos.
The Supreme Court may distinguish pre-implanted from post-implanted embryos,
or may set forth holdings which affirmatively protect embryos in all contexts.
For now, it must be clear that the embryo's right to live will be considered, at
a minimum, a substantial right. Once an embryo has been created, efforts must
be made to protect its life and liberty by arranging for it to be implanted as
soon as possible to avoid its death or its parents' death before implantation.
Surrogate and adoptive mothers may be considered for this purpose.
2. Legislation Balances Embryo Rights with Competing Rights
If a state government acts to protect the embryo in a way that infringes
upon a fundamental right of a U.S. citizen, the state must prove that such
protection of the embryo serves a "compelling state interest," and that the
government action does not go beyond what is necessary to protect that interest.M'
If protection of the embryo interferes with some right that is less than funda-
mental, the state need only show that its action is rationally related to a
constitutionally permissible purpose.8 2 Therefore, the second important principle
in frozen embryo legislation is to properly employ a balancing test in the specific
scenarios which affect pre-implanted embryos by determining whether the com-
peting rights are fundamental.
3. Preventative Approach to Bioethical Dilemmas
The third important purpose of frozen embryo legislation is to take a
preventive approach to problems regarding the embryo. It is best to control
artificial conception, freezing, experimentation, and genetic engineering to prevent
tragic situations such as those in which the embryo is unwanted, experimented
upon, frozen indefinitely, or discarded because it is imperfect. Ultimately, proac-
tive legislation is much more desirable than letting these scenarios occur and then
trying to solve them after the situation has become impossibly complex.
These basic principles-the embryo's humanity, a proper balancing test, and
a preventive approach-should be incorporated into such a legislative act.
B. Statutory Provisions Addressing Specific Issues
1. Definitions
Such important terms as "embryo," "fetus," "research," "experimenta-
tion," "humanity," and "life" must be defined unambiguously, and in terms
which are not degrading to the embryo.
2. No Unnecessary Creation or Freezing of Embryos
The creation of an embryo must be prohibited unless it is for the purpose
of immediate implantation in a willing mother. Moreover, embryos should never
be frozen unless necessary due to an unanticipated externality. In no event should
181. C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 59, at 187.
182. Id.
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an embryo be frozen or kept frozen for the sole purpose of avoiding any moral/
legal issues. An egg donor must agree in advance to implant every embryo she
creates.' 3 The act should require clinics to counsel infertile couples and require
both the egg-donor and the sperm-donor to sign an agreement which expressly
governs the disposition of any embryos (frozen or not) in case of death of both
parents or divorce. The only options available should be to donate the embryos
to an infertile couple or, in case of divorce, to allow a court to decide which
parent should gain custody of the embryos, following traditional child custody
considerations.
If the donation option is exercised, the clinic will make all reasonable attempts
to locate an infertile couple (either within or outside of that clinic's specific IVF
program) for donation of the embryo. Clinic personnel must periodically review
the parties' agreement with them and allow the sperm and egg-donors to modify
their decisions.
Finally, the egg-freezing process should be developed and used as an alter-
native to embryo-freezing.
3. Acts Harmful to the Embryo
The next major chapter of the act should prohibit contracts or policies which
permit any conduct directly harmful to the embryo.1u These include discarding
the embryo,"8 5 freezing embryos unnecessarily, freezing the embryos for long
periods of time or indefinitely,8 6 dangerous experimentation, selling embryos, or
any other such activities. A state has a rational, if not a compelling, interest in
criminalizing such actions.
Any hospital or institution which claims a right to discard or indefinitely
freeze an embryo is not asserting a fundamental right. Therefore, the embryo's
right to life must prevail over the weaker contract or mere convenience interests
of the institution. The law should do whatever possible to discourage destruction
of embryos.
The natural parents may argue that they have a fundamental right to destroy
or indefinitely freeze an embryo as an extension of their procreative liberty if
they do not want lineal descendants,'1 however, this should be prohibited.'88
183. See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text for a discussion of the implications of
mandatory implantation.
184. See supra notes 119-135 and accompanying text. THm EcONOMIST referred to a bill in Great
Britain to ban the creation of human embryos for any purpose besides enabling a particular woman
to bear a child, and to ban any experimentation on embryos, because a human embryo is "a thing
'of which the sole purpose ... is that it may be a human life,' too precious to be traded for scientific
knowledge." Embryonic Backlash, Tim ECONOmIsT, Feb. 23, 1985, at 14 (quoting Enoch Powell).
185. "Mt. Sinai gives couples the right to have their embryos destroyed." Hundley, supra note
22. "Some centers refer to 'ethical methods' of embryo disposal. ... [olthers give couples the option
of overseeing embryo disposal, as if in a ritual of death." Bonmicksen, supra note 1, at 4.
186. Hundley, supra note 22; Bonnicksen, supra note 1, at 4.
187. Junior Davis testified that he would feel "raped of my reproductive rights" if Mrs. Davis
implanted the embryos which the couple created during their marriage. Smothers, supra note 51, at
A13.
188. "The mere possibility that a biologically related child exists might cause some donors
discomfort, yet this cannot be considered sufficient enough harm to outweigh the state's interest in
protecting and preserving the embryo's development." Wurmbrand, supra note 6, at 1097.
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A frozen embryo may deteriorate over time to a point where it is no longer
able to survive implantation.8 9 To allow this to happen is to violate the embryo's
right to life. The responsible parties must be required to make reasonable efforts
to locate volunteers to implant embryos before it is too late.'19 This should be
done as soon as possible because keeping a human life frozen in liquid nitrogen
for an extended period of time deprives it of its liberty. Nature wants it to be
born. A prohibition of such treatment of embryos must be a permissible state
action.
Persons who want to perform dangerous experimentation on embryos are
asserting a "right"' 191 that is even less fundamental than those described above;
it really is not a right at all, and the embryos' rights must prevail.' 92
Related to these issues is the question of selling embryos. 93 This practice is
directly harmful to the dignity of the embryo and must be forbidden by the
act. 19
4. Custody Questions
It is of vital importance that the act address custody questions. These include
cases where the institution that is holding the embryo claims a contractual right
to the embryo in conflict with its natural parents, 195 custody battles between the
natural parents,'9 and custody of an orphaned embryo whose fate was not
predetermined by its parents. 97
The bill should forbid institutions from entering into and enforcing contracts
which give custody of embryos to organizations or persons other than their
natural parents. The state has a compelling interest in protecting the fundamental
procreative right of the natural parents to bear their embryo and the embryo's
right to be gestated and raised by its natural parents. Prior to death or divorce
of the parties, natural parents will always have custody rights superior to those
of an IVF clinic. An institution's interest in keeping an embryo for implantation
for the benefit of some other couple, for experimentation, or for indefinite
freezing is clearly not fundamental, and may not prevail against the rights of the
natural parents. 198
189. Ozar, supra note 38, at 9; Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496 (Equity Division I Sept. 22, 1989)
(LEXIS, Tenn library, Cases file) at 8 ("reliable medical data indicated the practical storage life of
the human embryos would probably not exceed two years.").
190. See note 88 and accompanying text.
191. Proponents of embryo research argue that it leads to better treatment of infertility, early
diagnosis and prevention of genetic diseases, and improvements in contraceptive technology. Mora-
toriums on Embryo Research, 18 HAsTnos CENTER REP. 2 (June/July 1988). Opponents argue that
there are other ways to treat infertility and congenital disease, and some compare embryo research
to the Nazi experiments in Auschwitz. Id.
192. In February, 1988, the West German cabinet requested criminal penalties for research on
human embryos. Embryonic Backlash, supra note 184. In Great Britain in 1987 the government
proposed criminalization of research on gene manipulation of human embryos, cloning of embryos,
or creating hybrid embryos. Id.
193. See generally Annas, Redefining Parenthood and Protecting Embryos: Why We Need New
Laws, 14 HAsTI NOS CENTER REP. 50, 51 (Oct. 1984).
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 46-49, 131-135 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 50-52, 119-130 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
198. A holding which is consistent with this principle is found in the York case. See supra notes
46-49, 131-135 and accompanying text.
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When one natural parent competes for custody against the other who is the
spouse or former spouse, the embryo must be considered a person, and the
matter of custody must proceed as if the embryo were born, without regard to
property law.'" The best interests of the embryo are of utmost importance. If
one parent wishes to make his or her best efforts to implant the embryo, facilitate
its birth, and raise the resulting child, that parent must receive priority over the
other, barring evidence that such parent is unfit. If each parent intends the
above, then the matter must be treated under the existing laws of custody in the
state.
If one natural parent is a paid sperm or egg donor who requests custody,70
and both parents intend to facilitate the birth of the child, then the embryo's
life and liberty are not threatened. Therefore, at this point, contract law may
enter into the decision, and the matter may be decided accordingly, provided the
embryo's best interests are considered. The law must forbid clinics and institutions
from giving custody automatically to the natural parent of a particular gender,
as this may violate the equal protection rights of the other parent. Moreover,
such preference tends to label the embryo as property because it determines who
should get it based on who "paid" more for it. 2°
Finally, natural parents should be required to prepare a detailed will before
creating an embryo, to prevent the problem of what to do with their estate, and
with the embryo, should the embryo outlive them.20
5. Orphaned Embryos As Heirs
This issue arises when the parents of an embryo die either with or without
a will. °3 In addition to the trusts and estates sections of the state code which
would control this scenario, the bill should state that an existing embryo (frozen
or not) should be considered a child in gestation for the purpose of inheritance. 204
If after two years - the estimated longest length of time after which a frozen
embryo deteriorates to a non-implantable state2°5-the embryo has not been born,
however, the estate should be disposed of without regard to the embryo.
C. Procedural Suggestions
In addition to the proposed foregoing statutory provisions, the following are
other procedures which the authors believe to be essential to any such legislation:
1) Establish a standing committee (with representatives from a wide variety
of backgrounds similar to the Australian model, Victoria's 1984 Act) to advise
199. See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
200. See generally Annas, supra note 193, at 50-51.
201. The policy of Detroit's Hutzel Hospital is that when a couple divorces, the embryo
automatically goes to the wife because the laparoscopy a woman endures in egg donation involves
more risk and commitment than does sperm donation. Hundley, supra note 22, at 25.
202. "The moral right not to be killed does not automatically imply a right to the use of a
womb. For an embryo may be implanted in a womb only by the free choice of the woman whose
womb it is." Ozar, supra note 38, at 9. This is why the parents must arrange for such a womb in
advance, in case of death or other circumstances. See also Wurmbrand, supra note 6, at 1100
(participants should be required to provide for adoption).
203. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
204. Id.




the state's Health Department concerning current and emerging IVF procedures
(such as egg freezing);
2) Establish licensing requirements (both pre-approval and on-going reporting
requirements) for any clinic or hospital seeking to provide IVF procedures;
3) Allocate government funds for research and development to perfect egg-
freezing techniques that can substitute for embryo-freezing in cases where multiple
eggs are removed in laparoscopies. The point at which egg-freezing can be safely
and widely used is apparently not far off, and resource commitments should be
encouraged to make that day arrive as soon as possible.
V. CONCLUSION
As evidenced by the numerous possible factual scenarios and court cases
referred to in this note, each of which raises perplexing legal and moral issues,
our judicial system clearly needs specific legislation to guide it with regard to
IVF and frozen human embryos. Without such a framework, our courts will
continue to stumble and create a confusing morass of rulings which have a
variety of social and moral policies as their bases. Already, the revolutionary
IVF and embryo-freezing practices have created conflicts which existing statutory
law is inadequate to resolve. The human essence of the embryo makes it a
valuable form of life which must be legally protected. It is important that uniform
legislation, such as that proposed here, be adopted immediately by state legisla-
tures to protect the fundamental rights of the embryo.
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